farther correction, 'tis of such-a-one as is either useless or imaginary…As the ultimate standard of these figures is deriv'd from nothing but the senses and imagination, 'tis absurd to talk of any perfection beyond what these faculties can judge of…(Treatise, II, iv) -By this full-fledged assault on our knowledge of the necessary, Hume takes himself to abolish much worthless metaphysics.
-Hume's epistemological methodology is (logically) atomist -all our knowledge is built up (in principle) from impressions and the ideas they generate.
Metaphysical necessity rides again -Fast-forward to C20th. It seems in fact not all necessity can be reduced to what is 'true by definition'. Some is discovered. E.g. 'Water is H 2 O'. New category of a posteriori necessity (a.k.a. 'metaphysical necessity').
-This is described as a posteriori, as it was scientists who discovered the chemical formula of water. However strictly speaking the scientists did not discover that the statement is necessarily true. This is attributed by philosophers, initially by consulting 'intuitions' (about an imaginary planet, Twin Earth).
-When such intuition came to appear rather under-theorised, modal epistemology began to be spelt out further in terms of conceivability.
-Yablo (1993) "A proposition p is conceivable iff one can imagine a world that one takes to verify p". (Then a proposition is possibly true if it is conceivable. It is necessarily true if it is not conceivable that it not be true.) -However this imagining is to be distinguished from imaging…. (it is a more rationalist process). Just what it is is a little vague (Van Inwagen -actually it is question-begging → modal skepticism) - Chalmers (2002) follows Yablo (with some extra bells and whistles) but also down on imaging (distinction between perceptual imagination and modal imagination…).
My argument
Key Hypothesis: Structural articulation is the source of all necessity. Necessary reasoning is in essence just a recognition that a certain structure has the particular structure that it in fact has.
-Anne Newstead distinguishes 3 positions re. the role of diagrams in mathematical reasoning: i) of essential value, ii) mere heuristic aid, iii) harmful. I am arguing for i).
-To do this it is helpful to draw on a Peircean 3-way distinction between kinds of sign:
Peirce: Icon, index, symbol These 3 fundamental kinds correspond to 3 ways in which a sign can pick out its object:
-Icon: by possessing the quality signified (e.g. maps, mathematical diagrams).
-Index: via some direct unmediated relationship (e.g. smoke/fire, "this", "∃x").
-Symbol: via some kind of (further, independent, arbitrary) convention or rule (e.g. "cat", a red traffic light).
-Icons are the only signs whose signification (can) have internal structure. An index is just a pointer, and the convention by means of which the symbol symbolizes what it does is external to it. The perspicuous representation of relations via structural resemblance is one of the icon's greatest strengths. (Another of Peirce's definition of the icon: an icon's parts should be related in the same way that the objects represented by those parts are themselves related.) -Symbols signify general concepts. Indices signify particular things. Icons signify neither, what Peirce calls a pure dream…This is just a way of saying that for icons, the relationship between sign and object is closer than for the other 2 types. Also, only when icons and indices are embedded in symbols does one get a true or false claim.
-But can't a distorted photo of Obama 'falsely state' that that is how he looks? -Qua picture, the photo just is what it is. To interpret it as saying something false about Obama is to: i) peg it to a real-world object (index), ii) claim something general about that object's appearance (symbol).
-Most real-world signs are a mixture of these 3 (e.g. 'I' is index insofar as it indicates its speaker, and symbol insofar as we learn it's the word 'I' that plays this role. Real-world arguments draw on all 3 sign-types. E.g.: -Arguably, what the Tortoise fails to 'see' is a structural isomorphism shared by a sign and an act. A little mysterious perhaps, but the Achilles and the Tortoise story shows how ubiquitous and fundamental it is. It is this structural isomorphism that shows that the 'logical must' is iconic. So how do perceived structures lead to actions? (Deep issues about normativity at this point…) -Here one might define an internalism about logic, analogous to the metaethical notion, whereby if one is not motivated to act by logical norms, one does not fully understand them. But then the question becomes -whence such internalism?
Brandom: 'Positive Logical Freedom' -One of the few contemporary philosophers to explicitly face this issue is Brandom. He writes "…the most urgent philosophical task is to understand…the bindingness or validity…of conceptual norms".
-The key is a Kantian concept of positive freedom. "Before Kant, freedom had traditionally been understood in negative terms: as freedom from some kind of constraint. He revolutionized our thought by introducing the idea of positive freedom: freedom to do something." (i.e. to do something that you could not do before, even though no-one would have stopped you).
Such freedom relies on 2 apparently opposing forces which in fact work together: -One makes individual choices to act -One surrenders to norms of ethics which appraise those acts as right or wrong "…autonomy, binding oneself by a norm, rule, or law, has two components, corresponding to 'autos' and 'nomos'. One must bind oneself, but one must also bind oneself. If not only that one is bound by a certain norm, but also what that norm involves…is up to the one endorsing it, the notion that…a distinction has been put in place between what is correct and incorrect according to that norm goes missing." (Brandom, "Kantian Lessons about Mind, Meaning and Rationality", pp. 12-13).
Together these result in a 'bonanza' of positive freedom -to live in civil society, buy things on Trademe…and so on. Similarly in the realm of logic:
-One makes individual assertions -One surrenders to norms of logic -But this results in a "bonanza of positive expressive freedom" -a freedom to say things which would be impossible without such surrender (in fact Brandom points out "…almost every sentence uttered by an adult native speaker is radically novel.") -Only disagree with Brandom in Hegelian twist he puts on all this (p. 16 "what maintains [the norms of logic] is the attitudes of others…"). To me, the fact that these necessities are seen puts a more realist face on it. Something is going on here which is more enigmatic than conventionalism (also recall, we saw convention = symbol. We are here considering the icon.)
Peirce's Existential Graphs The following formulae are all logically equivalent:
By contrast to algebraic logic, in Peirce's existential graphs their equivalence can be seen. For example if we graph i), we get:
However 'double cuts' are visibly equivalent to double negation and accordingly may be removed:
This clearly represents: (S & R & Q) ⊃ P).
-When one aspect of a diagram forces another aspect to be a certain way, this enables us to 'see' necessity.
-The more this can happen, the more perspicuous the formalism is (in other words, qua our initial definition of the icon, the more its parts are related in the same way that the objects represented by those parts are themselves related).
-Even algebraic logic when used correctly forces us to only prove valid theorems (in a sound system). It is thus irreducibly iconic also. It is just that it contains more arbitrary rules which must be learned. Thus the phrase 'symbolic logic' is a bit of a misnomer. In Peircean terms the true distinction is between algebraic and graphical logics and the distinction merely concerns how perspicuous the icons are.
-But surely we could devise conventions that would allow us to represent, say, the rules of algebra symbolically (e.g. call modus ponens 'Fred')?
-Peirce: we could, but any coherent usage is parasitic on a prior iconic understanding.
-Early Wittgenstein with his 'Picture Theory of Meaning' grasped this vision of iconic perspecuity in characteristically pure (and impractical / OTT?) form:
Symbols are not what they seem to be. In "aRb" "R" looks like a substantive but is not one. What symbolizes in "aRb" is that R occurs between a and b. . . . (Notebooks 1914-16, 
